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Introduction
The decision to use the case of Tu-
rin in a comparative study of me-
tropolitan governments in Europe
might appear an anomalous one.
More than anywhere else in Italy,
the problem of governing the Tu-
rin urban area has, de facto, been
erased from the political agenda
of the principal local institutions.
Vice versa, it may be useful to at-
tempt a parallel reconstruction of
the theoretical and institutional
debate on the prospects of metro-
politan governance and the initia-
tives of the principal wide area
service policies to answer some of
* Istittuto di Ricerche Economico-Sociali del Piemonte - Turin.
E-mail: maggi@ires.csi.it
piperno@ires.csi.it
the questions posed by the overall
research project.
The first of these questions
concerns the emergence of a mo-
del of governance to replace tra-
ditional government. The fact
that the term ‘governance’ is so
hard to translate into Italian gives
some idea of the difficulty which
this new paradigm is meeting he-
re in Italy, although awareness of
this need is now precisely felt in
the Turin area. The concept of
metropolitan governance implies
governing a metropolitan area
without a formal local govern-
ment organisation. It is thus pos-
sible to verify whether a model of
this type, albeit partial and em-
bryonic, has emerged in the Tu-
rin area.
The second question concerns
the development of the system of
intergovernmental relations in
Piedmont. Relations between the
various levels of government have
a specific regional dimension:
they vary, that is, from one part of
the country to another according
to existing socio-economic and
politico-institutional conditions.
The fact that metropolitan gover-
nance has developed one way in
Turin and another in Bologna
confirms this hypothesis1.
The third question is about in-
stitutional innovation. It asks: is
innovation possible without a for-
mal general metropolitan govern-
ment structure?
This report is split into four
parts. The first sketches an extre-
mely schematic outline of the pa-
rallel institutional and socio-eco-
nomic development of the area
over the last thirty years. The fact
is that Turin as a city is a symbol
of the post-war Italian economic
miracle and national urbanisa-
tion, just as it has since become a
typical case of deindustrialisation,
in which new models of urban de-
velopment have begun to emerge
and the need for institutional
change is sharply felt.
The second part describes how
the principal networked services
– the ones, that is, which ideally
require a wide area institutional
organisation – are run, verifying
the advantages and disadvantages
of the functional models curren-
tly being adopted.
The framework which emerges
is still unclear. The fact is that lo-
cal elites’ awareness of the pro-
blems of urban governance
within the new context of inter-
national competition and their
capacity to come up with strate-
gic new projects are still conspi-
cuous by their absence. In the
third part of the report, we seek
to understand why. 
The fourth and final part ad-
dresses the basic question of
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1 It is interesting to note that this is the second time that the two cities have been com-
pared in an international comparative research project (cf. Euricur, 1996).
whether Turin needs a new model
of urban government or not. Or,
alternatively, are minor correc-
tions to the policies in progress all
that is needed? 
1.  Institutions 
and economic development 
in the Turin metropolitan area
1.1  Socio-economic trends
What exactly is the Turin me-
tropolitan area? It would take a
whole report on its own to answer
this one simple question. Geo-
graphers, sociologists, economists
and urban planners have argued
over what criteria to use to delimit
the plausible boundaries of the
area without ever coming to any
unanimous conclusion. For our
purposes, we follow the only exi-
sting administrative delimitation
(fig. 1), which dates from 19722,
and which comprises 52 of Turin’s
neighbouring ‘comuni’, or com-
munes, in two concentric circles.
The demographic and econo-
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2 An area comprising the commune of Turin and another 52 communes on the basis of
DPGR No. 719 of 1972 issued by the Piedmontese Regional Authority. 
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Figure 1   Administrative borders of the Turin metropolitan area
Communes comprised in
the delimitation of 1972
Communes comprised in
the delimitation of 1991
mic evolution of Turin over the
last thirty years reflects some of
the typical phases in urban deve-
lopment: urbanisation, suburba-
nisation, deurbanisation and
reurbanisation.
“In the urbanisation phase, po-
pulation and economic activity
concentrates in urban centres.
In the suburbanisation phase
the growth of the suburbs out-
strips that of the city centre and,
eventually, there is a shift of po-
pulation and jobs to the su-
burbs. In the deurbanisation
phase the wider conurbation as
a whole loses population, smal-
ler urban areas grow and a mo-
re decentralised urban system
develops. In the reurbanisation
phase, cities which have been
losing population begin to grow
again” (Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 1992).
In the seventies (in some cases
even earlier), the population of the
central city of the metropolitan
area began to decline, while the
growth of that of the inner urban
rings also began to dwindle. At the
same time, the population of the
external rings and often also of the
periurban agricultural belts has in-
creased, with a consequent diffu-
sion of residential settlement and
production activities. Since this is
not the place to address the causes
of the phenomenon – which stem
from transformations in urban
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economic bases, production tech-
nologies and real estate markets –
we refer the reader to the vast lite-
rature which already exists on the
subject. For our purposes, it is suf-
ficient to stress that Turin is not
devoid of this tendency, although
it does display peculiarities with
respect to other Italian and Euro-
pean metropolitan areas.
In 1951, Turin had a popula-
tion of over 700,000 inhabitants,
in 1961 of more than a million,
and the number continued to in-
crease continuously until 1974,
when it reached a peak of
1,205,000 inhabitants (urbanisa-
tion). The trend was subsequently
reversed and Turin’s population
began to decrease; since 1990 it
has dropped below one million.
In the same years, the popula-
tion of the suburbs grew (subur-
banisation) to such an extent that
it set off the drop in the number
of inhabitants of the central com-
mune, but this only happened un-
til the eighties. Subsequently, the
growth of suburban areas ceased
to compensate for the decrease in
Turin so that, in 1991, the popu-
lation of the metropolitan area
fell by more than 100,000 inhabi-
tants – a clear symptom of deur-
banisation – although between
1981 and 1991 the growth rate of
the population in the first ring ex-
ceeded 6.4% and that of the se-
cond ring 4.5%. Yet it would be
premature to interpret this trend
as a sign of reurbanisation.
The most recent migratory
trends (1991-’95) show (see table
2) that the drop in population in
Turin stems from the exchange
with other Piedmontese commu-
nes and between the latter and
the extended metropolitan area3.
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Table 2   Migration from and to Turin
Immigrants Emigrants Balance
to Turin % from Turin %
Rest of metrop. area 33,661 35.7 65,118 49.9 -31,457
Rest of Piedmont 15,186 16.1 26,365 20.2 -11,179
Rest of  Italy 33,632 35.7 34,906 26.8 -1,.274
Abroad 10,435 11.1 3,472 2.7 6,963
Not determined 1,247 1.3 517 0.4 730
Total 94,161 100.0 130,378 100.0 -36,217
Source: Conforti - Davico - Mela, 1997.
3 Composed in this case of the 52 communes of the original delimitation plus another 56
bordering communes (cf. Conforti - Davico - Mela, 1997). 
Against an influx of 94,000 new
residents, the city registered an
outflow of 130,000 people.
Breaking down the total figure by
areas of origin/destination, it
emerges clearly that the drop is
largely due to the population ex-
change with communes in the
metropolitan area (31,467 inhabi-
tants). As a consequence, a dyna-
mic trend in population was re-
corded only in the second and
third rings (table 1), and this, in
turn, suggests that the deurbani-
sation phase is persisting.
Within this framework of demo-
graphic decline, one important
new development is the growth in
the inflow of immigrants from
countries outside the EU. In Sep-
tember 1996 17,000 non-EU citi-
zens – 33% of whom from Mo-
rocco – were registered in Turin.
The figure considerably underesti-
mates the effective presence of fo-
reigners, failing to take into ac-
count the number of illegal immi-
grants (at least 10,000). Although
it corresponds to a relatively low
percentage of the total population
of Turin, and is hence by no means
comparable with other European
metropolises, it has been large
enough to trigger a good deal of
social tension. The 1997 election
campaign in Turin, for example,
was dominated by the question of
urban safety, relegating serious
problems such as that of economic
development to a secondary role.
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Table 3   Level of education in some metropolitan areas in Italy
(percentage of over six by degree of education) 1991
Graduates High Lower Elementary Without 
school middle qualifications
Central cities
Turin 6.0 21.9 34.0 29.0 8.8
Milan 9.3 27.7 32.8 23.6 6.4
Bologna 9.6 24.2 27.5 30.6 8.1
Rome 8.5 28.3 30.2 24.3 8.7
Provinces
Turin 4.0 19.7 34.3 32.2 9.0
Milan 5.2 23.4 33.8 29.4 8.0
Bologna 6.0 21.4 28.7 33.0 10.9
Rome 7.0 26.2 31.1 25.8 9.9
Source: Istat. Central cities: data refer only to the biggest municipality in the area;
provinces: data refer to the provincial administrative area.
This process is transforming
the urban area of Turin from a
‘monocentric’ structure to an in-
creasingly ‘polycentric’ one in
which the emerging ‘subpoles’
are displaying growing autonomy
with respect to the central pole.
This has undoubtedly hampered
the building of a metropolitan
identity, aggravating the fears of
surrounding communes vis-à-vis
the risk of exploitation by Turin,
as we see below. 
The way the economic structure
has developed also reveals a gra-
dual transformation from an eco-
nomic system based on industrial
activities to one dominated by ter-
tiary services, even though the Tu-
rin area continues to be much mo-
re industrialised than other me-
tropolitan areas in Italy. This tran-
slates (table 3) into a lower level of
education in the Turin metropoli-
tan area due to the increased im-
portance of relatively skilled occu-
pation in industry.
A brief glance at tables 4-5
shows how the importance of oc-
cupation in the various economic
activities, in industry especially,
has gradually increased in the pe-
W o r k i n g  p a p e r  n .  1 2 4 ,  1 9 9 9
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Table 4   Occupation in firms and other activities in Turin 
and its rings
1981
Industry % Others % Total %
Turin 212,490 49.8 262,735 71.5 475,275 59.8
First ring 136,269 32.0 64,798 17.6 201,099 25.3
Second ring 59,446 13.9 29,420 8.0 88,880 11.2
Third ring 18,203 4.3 10,733 2.9 28,940 3.6
Total 426,408 100.0 367,686 100.0 794,194 100.0
Total area ‘72 408,205 356,953 765,254
1991
Industry % Others % Total %
Turin 147,455 43.8 277,719 67.4 425,218 56.8
First ring 119,018 35.3 84,117 20.4 203,170 27.1
Second ring 52,478 15.6 36,329 8.8 88,823 11.9
Third ring 18,020 5.3 13,974 3.4 31,999 4.3
Total 336,971 100.0 412,139 100.0 749,210 100.0
Total area ‘72 318,951 398,165 717,211
Source: Istat, Industrial Census Data (agricultural occupation not considered).
ripheral rings. Hence in 1991 (ta-
ble 5) the two rings outstripped
Turin in terms of their share of in-
dustrial occupation (53.8%). Fol-
lowing a perfectly symmetrical
trend (table 6), Turin became a
largely service-based city as early
as 1981 (55% of employment),
whereas the metropolitan area of
53 municipalities (TMA) registe-
red the primacy of service occu-
pation in 1991 (55%). Between
1981 and 1991 the metropolitan
area lost about 90,000 jobs in in-
dustry, most of them located in
the central city.
This series of transformations
has been widely interpreted as a
symptom of the decline of the
area following the decline of the
traditional production base, cen-
tred round the mechanical engi-
neering industry and means of
transport. In the early nineties,
the high rate of unemployment,
which has risen from an average
of 8% in the late eighties to
10,5%, the constant drop in the
number of industrial workers and
firms and Turin’s descent in clas-
sifications of Italian provinces in
terms of income per capita (figu-
W o r k i n g  p a p e r  n .  1 2 4 ,  1 9 9 9
12
Table 6   Share of occupation in industry and services 
in 1981 and 1991
% Industry % Others
1981 1991 1981 1991
Turin 44.7 34.7 55.3 65.3
52 TMA* 67.5 58.7 32.5 41.3
Total 53.3 44.5 46.6 55.5
* TMA: Turin metropolitan area.
Source:Istat, Industrial Census Data.
Table 5   Percentage of occupation in industrial firms in Turin and
its rings
1951 1981 1991
Turin 82.1 52.0 46.2
First ring 12.4 33.4 37.3
Second ring 5.5 14.6 16.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Istat, Industrial Census Data.
re 2) were signs of a situation of
stress against which no new form
of metropolitan polarisation th-
rough the development of tech-
nological/managerial managed to
emerge. Another sign of the pro-
blems of transition of the Turin
economy was the fact that, in
1994, the city and its province
were earmarked as one of the re-
gions covered by objective 2 of
the European Union’s structural
policies. 
Whether the economic revolu-
tion was doomed to progressive
decline or whether instead it con-
cealed positive factors for ele-
ments of reorganisation and pro-
ductive conversion is still a
subject of analysis and discussion.
In the period from 1992 to 1995
the prevailing feeling in Turin was
undoubtedly one of pessimism,
but in recent years a significant
shift has taken place, bolstered by
some of the strong points of the
system.
The area’s industry still looks
abroad a lot. Between 1988 ex-
ports from the province of Turin
accounted for 9% of the Italian
total; in 1993, the figure had fal-
len to 6.9%, although it has sub-
sequently risen again, thanks ini-
tially to the devaluation of the li-
ra, returning to 8% in 1995 and
7.9% in 1996, thus offering proof
of the competitive capacity of
firms in the area.
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Figure 2   Added value per capita per inhabitant in four provinces 
(index with respect to the Italian average = 100)
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Furthermore, on the basis of re-
cent projections, from now until
2000 exports from the province
of Turin will show an annual
growth rate in excess of 8%. The
most recent estimates of provin-
cial revenue for the same period
show growth rates significantly
higher than in other areas of the
country (i.e., the North-east and
the Centre).
A recent survey by the Turin
Employers’ Association revealed
that industrial firms in the area
are extremely internationalised,
not only in terms of the export-
production ratio. One firm out of
every five interviewed has decen-
tralised production phases
abroad, 17% receive funding out-
side Italy, 23% use foreign tech-
nicians and 37% buy in technolo-
gies from abroad.
Last but not least, 67% of so-
called ‘innovative firms’ registe-
red in Piedmont in all size classes
are concentrated in the province
of Turin4.
Turin is thus by right one of the
European areas most heavily af-
fected by economic globalisation
processes and the competitive
stress which they generate. Com-
pared with those of other regions
affected by deindustrialisation
processes, the local economy
shoulders the burden of over-spe-
cialisation in some mature pro-
duction sectors, as well as Turin’s
image as a ‘one company town’. It
is a well known fact that other old
industrial regions with more dif-
ferentiated economic structures
have suffered the reorganisation-
redevelopment-image relaunch
process much less (Chinitz,
1961). Fiat’s economic weight in
the Turin area has nevertheless
decreased considerably. Accor-
ding to IRES estimates, between
1986 and 1996 employment gene-
rated by the Fiat group decreased
from 92,000 to 47,000 units, fal-
ling from 25% to 15% of total in-
dustrial occupation (craft-based
enterprises excluded).
Generally speaking, the occu-
pational importance of small and
medium enterprises increased.
Between 1981 and 1991, the per-
centage of people employed in
firms with fewer than 100 em-
ployees increased from 55% to
64%. In the metropolitan area,
made up of 53 communes, the in-
cidence of occupation in innova-
tive segments of the service sector
(financial, business and professio-
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4 Cf. IRES, 1997,  and CCIAA, 1996. Analysis of the information pool produced by the Ob-
servatory of the diffusion of innovation, set up by the Chambers of Commerce of Pied-
mont and built on the basis of a set of selection criteria, highlights how, of the 2,600 firms
recorded, about two thirds make use of leading-edge technologies and acquire techno-
logical knowhow through an autonomous research centre. To give an idea of their rela-
tive incidence, suffice it to think that in the 1991 census about 13,000 manufacturing
firms were present in Piedmont, about 7,000 of them in the province of Turin.
nal services) increased from 24%
to 30%.
As a consequence, processes of
reorganisation of the social
morphology of the city and its
metropolitan area due to post-in-
dustrial transition are also less
evident than in other urban areas.
More specifically, analyses of
1991 figures highlight the fact
that Turin displays none of the
conspicuous phenomena of ur-
ban dualism5 which have charac-
terised the largest European me-
tropolitan areas (Ires, 1995b).
In conclusion, all the classic in-
dicators highlight that the Turin
metropolitan area is passing 
through a phase of demographic
and occupational stagnation, ac-
companied by processes of redi-
stribution of population and local
economic business activities. This
socio-economic and spatial reor-
ganisation involves a redefinition
both of the reciprocal roles of Tu-
rin and its external rings to re-
launch both the economic attrac-
tiveness of Turin in terms of high
quality service activities and its
residential attractiveness for the
population working in these sec-
tors. In this respect, it is worth
pointing out how Turin’s transi-
tion into a post-Fordian metro-
polis has been littered with hold-
ups and difficulties. Over the last
few years, this diagnosis of Turin
has been relatively widely shared
and has influenced the debate on
metropolitan institutions: the hal-
ting of the economic decline of
Turin and its metropolitan area
and its relaunching on new eco-
nomic bases was one of the key
messages of the 1993 electoral
campaign (the first to envisage
the direct election of the mayor),
which saw the victory of an
unorthodox centre-left coalition
led by a university professor, Va-
lentino Castellani, from outside
the world of politics. 
1.2  Institutional trends
The framework of intergovern-
mental relations in Italy is a com-
plex one. The debate on a possi-
ble federalist-oriented reform of
the Italian state has now brought
the entire three-tier Region-Pro-
vince-Commune system under
review. For our purposes, two ba-
sic aspects deserve mention. The
first is the growth of the political
clout of medium-large cities
thanks both to electoral reform
and renewed commitment to lo-
cal development policies. The dy-
namism of such cities has been
evident in the initiatives of their
mayors, of the National Associa-
tion of Italian Communes (ANCI)
and of the Union of Italian Pro-
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5 By ‘urban dualism’ we mean the concentration in the central city of population of high
social class and groups with low, irregular income, with an accentuation of the process
of suburbanisation of the middle classes and blue-collar workers in the Fordian sector.
vinces (UPI). The latter two orga-
nisations are powerful national
lobbies which have fostered the
setting up of a new intergovern-
mental decision-making and ad-
visory body, the State-City-Auto-
nomies Conference, alongside
the pre-existing State-Regions
Conference. Basically speaking,
local authorities are unwilling to
accept any form of subordination
to the Regions, a sine qua non for
federal reform.
The second aspect is bound up
in the phenomenon of the growth
of functional administrations
(health, hydrogeological and en-
vironmental protection, water cy-
cle management and so on), as we
see below vis-à-vis networked ser-
vices in the Turin metropolitan
area. Combined with privatisa-
tion processes, this tends to strip
local government of technical and
managerial-type activities, with
the risk, on the one hand, of ca-
mouflaging forms of creeping re-
centralisation and, on the other,
of eroding citizens’ control over
activities of public interest. Both
aspects have weighed negatively
on metropolitan reform in Italy.
In Turin, the process of urban
development described in the
previous paragraph has had noto-
rious institutional consequences.
The lack of cohesion between ad-
ministrative units and the urban
system within which all the func-
tional interdependencies of a gi-
ven community happen demands
a reorganisation of local govern-
ment according to alternative mo-
dels which can be either structu-
ral or functional6. Our research
hypothesis was to verify the ex-
tent to which, whereas the Turi-
nese political-institutional debate
over the last thirty years has,
theoretically, been dominated by
the need to arrive at a structural
solution of metropolitan gover-
nance, we have, de facto, witnes-
sed the gradual emergence of a ty-
pe of metropolitan governance
that we might define as implicitly
functional. 
Albeit approximately and ex-
tremely synthetically, it is worth
identifying some of the phases of
the institutional debate that are
connected with the phases of the
economic and urban develop-
ment that we saw above.
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6 Given the aims of this seminar, the differences between the structural and functional
models of metropolitan governance are taken as understood. The structural solution is
based on the creation of a new level of government to carry out a plurality of functions
at metropolitan level; the functional solution, instead, identifies the different procedural
and administrative structures to address the main metropolitan problems; for example,
general associations among local authorities, a transport authority, miscellaneous agree-
ments among local authorities for specific policies, programme agreements, etc. These
models stem also from the intercommunal and supracommunal models presented in
Lefèvre, 1996.
During the industrialisation
and urbanisation phase (which la-
sted until the mid seventies), the
debate focused on institutional
hypotheses based on co-operative
models – especially at the plan-
ning level. An initial proposal for
an intercommunal planning sche-
me (envisaged by the town plan-
ning law of 1942) can be traced
back to 1951. It was subsequently
to develop through a series of
projects up to the Turin munici-
pality’s approval of the scheme in
1964, although only a few com-
munes in the metropolitan area
were to follow the city’s lead. The
experience had no practical con-
sequences7, one of the reasons for
this being that, throughout the
period in question, single com-
munes had pursued planning po-
licies totally at loggerheads with
the aims of the scheme. Parallel
collaboration initiatives were de-
veloped among the communes of
the ring administered by left-wing
majorities, often in conflict with
the decisions taken in Turin whi-
ch, until 1975, was governed by
centre-right and centre-left majo-
rities. An important factor in that
period was the approaching birth
of regional authorities. Although
some participants in the cultural
debate argued in favour of expe-
riences of metropolitan governan-
ce along the lines of European
and Canadian models or, at all
events, of the debate in the An-
glo-Saxon world, the prevailing
hypothesis was to assign the re-
gional authority the role of mana-
ging the planning of the metropo-
litan area as part of the urban
planning competences envisaged
by art. 117 of the Constitution.
As the process of industrial de-
velopment and urbanisation came
to an end, so an important new
player – the regional authority –
appeared on the stage. The period
between 1975 and 1980 (the se-
cond regional legislature) was ar-
guably the most florid for the va-
rious regional authorities, in terms
both of their institutional planning
capacity and their ability to in-
fluence central government and
other local autonomies. The regio-
nal authorities – and Piedmont’s
fits perfectly into the model – be-
gan by reorganising the system of
autonomies, introducing new in-
termediate levels of government
(‘comprensori’, or local districts,
including that of Turin) to down-
grade the role of provincial autho-
rities, seen more as decentralised
offshoots of central government
than as local government bodies.
Clearly, a strong level of governan-
ce of the metropolitan area, espe-
cially its structural variant, was
seen by the regional authorities as
a hindrance to the implementation
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7 For an effective reconstruction of the Turin intercommunal planning scheme episode,
see Urbanistica, Nos. 50-51, October 1967. 
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of its local policies. This contradic-
tion arose in those years and, as we
shall see, still continues to this day.
1980 marked an important poli-
tical and economic turnaround
for Turin. It was in that year, in
fact, that Fiat embarked upon a
major reorganisation process ba-
sed on massive lay-offs. After
blocking production for almost a
month, the unions were forced to
accept a compromise. Industrial
occupation began to fall in the
metropolitan area, and the pro-
cess of industrialisation/expan-
sion of the service industry typical
of many European cities and
towns speeded up.
From an institutional point of
view, 1980 also marked the begin-
ning of the third regional legisla-
ture (1980-’85). This was a period
in which regional authorities lost
much of the planning vigour they
had shown in the previous five
years and, at the same time, tradi-
tional local autonomies – provin-
cial authorities and, above all,
communes – reasserted their in-
fluence; directly aided and abet-
ted by the political parties they
were able to leapfrog the regional
authorities and deal directly with
central administrations.
In Turin, the ‘Fiat shock’ trigge-
red a debate, which was to deve-
lop in the course of the eighties,
against the paradigm of re-equili-
brium which had dominated re-
gional policies in the previous fi-
ve-year period. It soon became
clear that the big risk for the me-
tropolitan area lay not so much in
phenomena of congestion and ex-
ternal diseconomies caused by an
excessive concentration of pro-
duction activities as in the gradual
economic and social decline to
which it was prone (as had been
or was the case in other European
urban areas) due to the decline of
traditional industries – the car in-
dustry, first and foremost.
As early as 1982, Turin was
swept by a series of scandals which
caused a political crisis in the left-
wing municipal administration,
subsequently replaced by a cen-
tre-left administration in 1985
(and the same happened at regio-
nal level). The following years we-
re marked by instability and the
communal government’s activism
– alas, without any strategic plan-
ning or agreement with other
communes in the metropolitan
area – on major infrastructural
and real estate projects8.
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8 One of the most important investments in Turin was made in the new municipal sta-
dium, built for the 1990 World Cup. Turin’s leading soccer club, Juventus F. C., are cur-
rently involved in a dispute with the franchisees over excessive rental costs, and are th-
reatening to play their matches in other stadiums elsewhere in Italy unless they are gran-
ted permission to build a new smaller stadium with additional commercial centre func-
tions (on the Dutch and British model). This is one example of the consequences of the
euphoric climate of those years (cf. Ires, 1989, 1995a).
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The nineties, finally, have been
characterised by two major
reforms of the system of local go-
vernment in Italy – Law No.
142/1990 and Law No. 81/1993
on the direct election of mayors –
which have changed the institu-
tional reference framework
profoundly. More specifically, the
figure of the mayor has become
much more representative, capa-
ble of promoting significant inno-
vations in the local political sy-
stem – but also many an illusion
and unrealistic expectation – at
least until further reforms of the
local administrative system9, un-
der review by parliament in re-
cent months, are passed. It is also
true, however, that the direct elec-
tion of the mayor has returned the
commune ‘to the centre of the in-
stitutional system’, further deple-
ting the institutional clout and
prestige of the regional authority
and, secondarily, of the provincial
authority. In the final analysis, the
problem of the metropolitan area
was shelved in the eighties due to
institutional conflicts between the
various levels of government. But,
as we shall see, this did not mean
that no metropolitan policies we-
re implemented with regard to
networked services.
So how has the problem been
addressed over the last 30-40
years? It is worth stressing that, in
this period, the metropolitan pro-
blem has been formulated in dif-
ferent ways with contradictory in-
stitutional effects.
For brevity’s sake, we built the
model shown in table 7 in which
we outline the institutional deve-
lopment of Turin in relation to its
economic and urban develop-
ment and some reference para-
digms of possible conceptualisa-
tions of administrative challenges.
Institutional innovations stem
directly from the analytical refe-
rence categories which can be
used to define the metropolitan
area concept. Bruno Dente’s ef-
fective classification (Dente,
1989), widely used in the debate
over the last few years, identifies
three main innovations: ‘big villa-
ge’, ‘functional region’ and ‘capi-
tal city’. Below we provide a brief
outline of Dente’s theory, but
anyone wishing further details
should see Dente’s essay and the
now very extensive literature on
the subject10.
The first identifies the metropo-
lis as a ‘big city’, with an ‘outsize
urban settlement’, characterised
9 See the recent book by Luciano Vandelli, 1997, a brief and effective reconstruction of
the effects of the electoral reform of 1993. 
10 Cf. Dente, 1989. The literature on metropolitan areas is very rich indeed: see the bi-
bliography contained in Dente’s article and Ires’ two previous studies: Ires, 1991a and
Ires, 1991b.
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by a high concentration of popu-
lation, extra-agricultural activities
and infrastructure around one
main urban pole. The principal
problem of metropolitan gover-
nance is to produce public servi-
ces efficiently, capturing econo-
mies of urban scale and taking in-
to account the effects of service
overspills.
The second identifies the urban
metropolitan area as a complex,
integrated set of several interde-
pendent centres, each of which
characterised by a functional spe-
cialisation vis-à-vis residential,
productive and, in general, ‘envi-
ronmental’ functions (to describe
the phenomenon, we also speak
of functional or urban regions).
This set of interrelations demands
the governance of interdependen-
cies at a supramunicipal level by
planning an area vaster than the
one linked to the urban agglome-
rate itself.
The third, finally, identifies me-
tropolises as places characterised
20
Table 7   Economic growth, urban growth and institutional change
in Turin: a preliminary and tentative analytical framework
Economic Urban Years Institutional Administrative
growth growth change challenge
(paradigm)
Industrialisation Urbanisation- 1955-1975 Weak ‘Big village
suburbanisation intergovernmental problems’
(vertical and 
horizontal) 
co-operation
Deindustrialisation Suburbanisation 1975-1985 Regionalisation ‘Urban
agglomeration 
problems 
(functional region)’
Growth service Suburbanisation- 1985-1995 Stronger ‘Capital city 
industry deurbanisation intergovernmental problems’,
(horizontal- ‘big village 
functional-indirect) problems’
co-operation
Post-Fordism Deurbanisation- 1995-… Strong regionalism ‘Capital city 
reurbanisation or functional problems’
flexible 
metropolitan 
governance
by the presence of advanced
functions connected with strate-
gic decision-making activities and
innovation-intensive technologi-
cal processes demanding a speci-
fic socio-cultural environment
and high quality urban infrastruc-
ture. In this case, the metropolis
has a radius of influence which
transcends the regional and natio-
nal dimensions and develops a
network of relations with metro-
polises of comparable rank.
Over the years these three ima-
ges of metropolitan problems in
Turin have succeeded one
another, thus creating the need
for special institutional solutions.
Only rarely, however, have they
been addressed together.
Only the administrative chal-
lenge of wide area services has al-
lowed major steps forward to be
made, as we see in the section
that follows.
In Turin’s case, the questions of
the functional region and capital
city role were addressed as part of
the debate on the implementation
of Law No. 142/1990 during the
1990-’95 regional legislature,
although at the outset they ten-
ded to get mislaid in a dispute
over the boundaries of the new
authority. In 1991 the regional
junta presented a bill proposing a
relatively small-sized metropoli-
tan area of 33 communes by way
of application of the structural
model envisaged by Law No.
142/1990.
During the ensuing debate a re-
gional position developed in fa-
vour11 of the setting up of an ex-
perimental form of metropolitan
governance based on association,
beginning as a consortium and
subsequently becoming a confe-
rence of metropolitan communes;
here we saw explicit acceptance
of a functional (intercommunal)
model. In 1995, the new regional
junta suspended all institutional
initiatives in this direction, and
since then central commune has
adopted a wait-and-see stance,
although it officially favours a
functional approach. The mayor
Valentino Castellani has explicitly
referred to the experience of the
Agreement for the Metropolitan
City in Bologna12.
The role of the province of Tu-
rin has also been marginal,
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11 This position emerges with some force in a document published by the regional autho-
rity (cf. Regione Piemonte, 1994) proposing the setting up of an association for the Turin
metropolitan area made up not only of the regional and provincial authorities and commu-
nes in the area, but also the Chamber of Commerce, universities and research establish-
ments, non-profit associations, banking foundations, interest groups and public and priva-
te firms. This is the only explicit proposal to date for a model of ‘metropolitan governance’. 
12 “Now, luckily, a new school of thought is prevailing: the one of a bottom-up functio-
nal approach. In this way we can deal with a variable geometry geographical structure”
(cf. Castellani, 1996, p. 111).
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although by virtue of its increased
functions it might be able to un-
lock the situation of institutional
stalemate in the future.
This is why institutional chan-
ges (table 7) since 1995 only show
an increase in forms of technical-
functional horizontal co-opera-
tion, developed largely through
municipal concerns, and a que-
stion mark looms over the scena-
rio of intergovernmental relations
that can be hypothesised in the
near future.
Ultimately, the case of Turin ef-
fectively shows how the mono-
poly of geographical representa-
tion by existing institutions has
de facto blocked processes of in-
stitutional innovation. 
2.  The development of the main
networked metropolitan services
Even without an institutionally
structured governmental autho-
rity, since the second half of the
nineties the principal networked
services have been developing in
implicit accordance with a metro-
politan reference scale. This type
of development was led by public
and private sector entities with
different forms of management
(franchises, contracting, reliance
on municipal concerns or consor-
tia, tenders, production through
communal municipal concerns
and so on). The services that are
most interesting to analyse from
an economic point of view are
those of the so-called ‘water cy-
cle’ (aqueduct and effluent water
softening services). 
2.1  The aqueduct service: 
municipal concerns, private
firms, communal management
Drinking water supply services
in the metropolitan area are ope-
rated by a plurality of bodies
adopting different management
models. Services are currently
supplied by:
– a municipal concern in Turin
and another 11 communes,
which represent 45% of the po-
pulation of the rest of the area;
– private firms in 12 communes
accounting for 46% of the po-
pulation outside Turin;
– direct production by the com-
mune in 8 communes.
In addition, a mixed private-pu-
blic company with a majority
communal stake operates for the
aqueduct of Alpignano. The early
nineties saw increases in the num-
ber of inhabitants served by the
municipal concern of Turin and
SAP-Italgas, which replaced direct
managements and the drinking
water company.
The water company considera-
bly enlarged its area of activity in
1982, first to small hillside com-
munes and then, from the late ei-
ghties, gradually to other commu-
nes in the area. The process of ex-
tension continued until recently
(figure 2), especially outside the
metropolitan area.
22
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The lack of a structured metro-
politan area appears not to have
given networked service the mu-
ch feared ‘leopard-spot’ configu-
ration.
If anything, the real problem is
that, despite the presence of two
concerns which compete against
each other (AAM and SAP-Italgas),
communes appear not to have
reaped the benefits of competi-
tion. One explanation for this mi-
ght be the administrative naiveté
of communes, undemanding
when they stipulate contracts.
Another might be the lack of
transparency of the main bidders.
An oligopolistic concern, be it
public or private, can achieve
economies of scale even without
structured metropolitan gover-
nance, but the problem of consu-
mer guarantee and protection re-
mains open.
2.2  Effluent water softening 
services
Technological and operational
unhomogeneities also exist for
services related with effluent wa-
ter (the collection and softening
of water from civilian and produc-
tive installations, the disposal of
softening muds and so on). The
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Figure 2   Expansion of the municipal aqueduct concern 
in the eighties and nineties
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quality of communal sewage
networks varies greatly; this partly
depends on their degree of wear
and tear and the separation
between water for civilian use and
water for industrial use. The
networks are almost always opera-
ted by the communes themselves
with their own personnel and pe-
riodical interventions by speciali-
sed firms; only in a few cases is the
service completely delegated to
private firms through special con-
ventions. Water softening, in-
stead, is almost entirely publicly
operated, carried out largely by
the Azienda Po Sangone which,
through a network of sewage col-
lectors, receives the effluent water
of 18 communes in the area other
than Turin, and covers 85% of the
population. Three consortia also
operate on behalf of 6 communes
(10% of the population of the
area). In the remaining 9 commu-
nes, water is softened at small
communally-owned plants self-
managed by private firms. In two
cases, a single firm operates both
aqueduct and sewage networks, as
well as softening plants.
The water softening concern
has expanded considerably in re-
cent years, especially outside the
metropolitan area. A total of 31
communes have joined the con-
sortium and, in 1997, five com-
munes in the area stipulated an
agreement with the company for
the management of sewer net-
works.
2.3 Other services
The area in which solid waste
cycle and transport activities ope-
rate has also expanded.
The collection and transport of
urban solid waste apparently re-
quires minimal ceilings of users
served to enable the operating
firm to use the capital allocations
needed optimally. It is also felt,
however, that it fails to give rise
to sizeable economies of scale
above this level (minimal ceilings
are, nonetheless, low, fewer than
100,000 inhabitants). A large
number of private and public
firms in the area provide a servi-
ce similar to that of the munici-
pal concern of Turin, with com-
parable cost burdens, calculated
in terms of spending by quintal
collected or inhabitant served,
and chargeable to the communes
involved. 
Less homogeneous procedures
are adopted to dispose of waste.
In certain cases, the service is in-
tegrated into municipal concerns
or consortia which already hand-
le the collection of solid urban
waste and dispose of it within the
area of the commune; in other ca-
ses, disposal is totally delegated
to the solid urban waste collec-
tion contractor.
The other services considered –
street cleaning and washing and
differentiated collection – are
provided virtually everywhere.
Albeit without expanding, the
transport service also has become
W o r k i n g  p a p e r  n .  1 2 4 ,  1 9 9 9
more integrated, especially throu-
gh tariff innovations. 
This service boasts a multiplicity
of operators in the area, and the
transport supply is largely radial,
converging on Turin. It consists of
both rail and road transport. 
The rail service is made up of
10 lines belonging to the Turin FS
State Railway division and the Tu-
rin-Ceres and Canavesana lines
operated under franchise by Satti.
Road transport is differentiated
into an urban/suburban service
(more frequent and continuous
with a basic fixed fare) and an in-
tercommunal service (less conti-
nuous with a fare system based on
block distances). The suburban
service largely covers the first ring
of Turin. Forty-seven companies
provide the local transport servi-
ce in the area. In view of the mo-
bility and commuter-type travel
round the node (Turin), not to
mention the present complexion
of the transport supply, the area
clearly has the right characteri-
stics for the integrated control of
mobility. The metropolitan city
configuration which emerges is
almost circular in shape with a ra-
dius of 15-20 km and is made up
of 35 communes besides Turin.
The single basic fare policy was
launched in 1996 under the ‘For-
mula’ project. The distinction
between urban, suburban, inter-
communal and rail fares was eli-
minated so that any user can tra-
vel on any means of public tran-
sport, be it rail or road, simply by
buying one unified travel docu-
ment (ticket or season ticket). 
2.4 Privatisations in progress
Law No. 142/1990 has laid the
bases for a large number of com-
munal activities to be performed
through autonomous forms of or-
ganisation, thus creating a new
model of communal management
which has been dubbed in some
quarters as ‘the Commune cum
holding company’. It is argued
that the Commune ought to
behave like a parent company
which performs no direct pro-
duction and trade activity, but
confines itself to directing subsi-
diaries. From the point of view of
the economy of local government,
these innovations are of broad in-
terest for at least two reasons. In
the first place, a sizeable part of
the activity carried out by Com-
munes could be privatised: the
economic criteria used to choose
between public and private sector
for the supply and production of
a given service are thus of consi-
derable operating importance.
Secondly, the legislation in que-
stion stems from the gradual cut-
ting of costs of the so-called natu-
ral monopolies as a result of a se-
ries of technological innovations,
which now tend to make forms of
competition possible even in sec-
tors (water, electricity, etc.) tradi-
tionally entrusted to communal
monopolies. As in Bologna, the
25
W o r k i n g  p a p e r  n .  1 2 4 ,  1 9 9 9
26
municipal concerns of Turin were
also swept by a wave of ‘neo-libe-
ralism’ – validated by the Partito
Democratico della Sinistra – whi-
ch led to the setting up of a speci-
fic communal department as early
as 1993. Now, four years on, the
gradual introduction of munici-
pal concerns onto the market
(quotation on the stock exchange
cannot be ruled out in the future,
but for the moment the Commu-
ne is holding onto a majority
stake) is, de facto, only just begin-
ning. The Commune has now
converted the water and electri-
city concerns (AAM and AEM) in-
to limited companies, while the
urban transport and urban hygie-
ne concerns (ATM and AMIAT) ha-
ve stayed under communal con-
trol with ‘special company’ status.
Only in the case of the electrical
concern has a minority share of
the capital been put on sale to the
private sector. Delays have been
caused both by political forces in
the city council and by the trade
unions and managers at the con-
cerns themselves, who are favou-
rable towards leaner forms of or-
ganisation but also determined to
maintain the balance of power of
the monopolistic management of
services. Concerns have seen the
reform as an opportunity to im-
plement their strategies more ef-
fectively in a supracommunal per-
spective, further developing the
implicitly functional model refer-
red to above. The ‘società per
azioni’ (limited company) model
offers them three types of advan-
tage. First, it facilitates the re-
course to indebtedness (through
forms of project financing, for
example) or, in any event, capita-
lisation to make the investment
necessary to develop networks
and service areas. Secondly, limi-
ted companies are no longer
subject to legal constraints from
the geographical point of view;
more precisely, unlike municipal
concerns they can provide their
services anywhere. Thirdly, the
choice of limited company legal
status ensures greater transpa-
rency in patrimonial and financial
dealings with the Commune,
although it reduces competition
for the service, which may be en-
trusted directly without a call for
tenders.
The social connotation of the
public services to be entrusted to
limited companies demands an
effective control system to assure
the public interest and ensure ser-
vice quality. Whereas in the case
of disposals (entrustment to third
parties), these guarantees are con-
tained in the deed of concession,
in the setting up of limited com-
panies the control is envisaged in
the convention which accompa-
nies the entrustment of the servi-
ce and is also guaranteed by the
powers attributed by law to the
communal assembly.
Two final considerations may
be pertinent to the analysis of our
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research project. First, the con-
cept of the metropolitan area as a
tool for solving the problems of
big cities through the direct pro-
duction of public services exploi-
ting economies of scale and scope
loses further ground. In contrast,
greater recourse to the market th-
rough privatisation stresses the
need for an authority monitoring
efficiency, guaranteeing competi-
tion, controlling quality and pro-
tecting consumers over an area
that is probably larger than that
strictly needed to achieve econo-
mies of scale. Secondly, the diffi-
culties encountered in the pro-
cess of privatisation reveal the on-
going mutual diffidence and im-
permeability of public and priva-
te actors. Hence the problems in-
volved in building coalitions of
interests at an urban level. It is no
coincidence that certain under-
the-surface signs of interest for
the municipal electrical concern
from Fiat group companies were
not received with overt enthusia-
sm in the city’s political debate.
3.  In search of political 
leadership
Why doesn’t the metropolitan
question figure in Turin’s political
agenda?
The answer lies in the insuffi-
cient initiative of local public and
private élites in building what, in
other parts of this study, has been
defined as a ‘public policy com-
munity’. Big industry plays a
major role among private local
élites in Turin. The saying ‘If Fiat
is well, Turin is well too’ shows
how the city was long identified
with the large-scale enterprise
round which its economic and, in
part, political systems rotated. In
recent years Fiat, which, it would
be wrong to forget, is Italy’s lar-
gest private industrial group, has
fully integrated in globalisation
processes, successfully installing
new production locations in Asia
(India) and South America (Bra-
zil, Argentina). Turin, of course,
is more than just Fiat and, as we
have seen, the area boasts a tech-
nologically rich industrial fabric.
In the services sector, it boasts the
recently privatised Istituto Banca-
rio San Paolo which, in terms of
assets, is Italy’s largest banking
group. Private players have failed,
however, to perform an active ro-
le in building a system of metro-
politan governance. The most at-
tentive observers of the Turin
area as a local society (Bagnasco,
1996, 1990; Gallino, 1990) have
long been agreed that difficulties
of policy-making are due to the
political subsystem’s weakness
with respect to the economic sy-
stem. “Turin emerged from For-
dism with an urgent need to re-
build politics” (Bagnasco, 1990,
p. 17). From this point of view,
the absence of an explicit metro-
politan government is simply the
other face of the absence of what
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has been defined as ‘orgware’13:
namely, organising capacity or
“the ability to enlist all actors in-
volved, and with their help to ge-
nerate new ideas and develop and
implement a policy designed to
respond to fundamental develop-
ments and create conditions for
sustainable development” (Van
den Berg - Braun - Van der Meer,
1997, p. 256), a concept which
can easily be traced to that of go-
vernance14. It is also true, howe-
ver, that it is not easy to weld the
economic strategies of the leading
local private sector and political
actors (Mazza, 1990). The first
are part of a network of interna-
tional economic relations which
inevitably pushes them away from
their local roots, given the lack of
a lucid political-institutional stra-
tegy capable of fostering the co-
operation of private interests,
especially through real estate and
infrastructure policies (i.e., tran-
sparent governance of the urban
revenue). For example, the Fiat’s
old Lingotto car production
plant, built in the twenties and a
splendid example of industrial ar-
chaeology, was converted into a
service centre without a clear ur-
ban development strategy on the
part of the city of Turin and still
shows unsatisfactory economic
returns (Bobbio, 1991; Van den
Berg - Braun - Van der Meer,
1997).
Will the new municipal political
class in the Turin area be capable
of recovering these delays? In
Italy detailed analyses have yet to
be made of the effects of commu-
nal electoral reform on the local
political class15. In Turin and some
13 The reference is to a study carried out by Euricur on behalf of the Eurocities Associa-
tion based on eight European cities, among which Turin, Bologna and Rotterdam. The
study sets out from the model of Porter (1990), who identifies three types of factors un-
derlying competitiveness in the different areas: tangible, ‘hardware’ factors such as la-
bour, capital and infrastructure; intangible ‘software’ factors such as those connected
with the quality of life; and, finally, ‘orgware’, the ability to handle urban hardware and
software effectively. Leadership, vision and strategy, strategic networks, political support
and societal support emerge as the critical factors for a successful organising capacity in
an urban area.
14 Attempts have been made to overcome this delay. The first was based on a cycle of se-
minars, ‘Discussions on Turin’ promoted by economic actors (including Fiat, GFT, Ban-
ca CRT, Istituto Bancario San Paolo) in 1988 and 1989, which sought to encourage scho-
lars, administrators and firms to open a debate on the future of the city (cf. Bagnasco,
1991). In 1992, through the Torino Incontra Association, the Turin Chamber of Com-
merce presented a dossier of proposals to relaunch Turin (Torino Incontra, 1992), invol-
ving all the strategic local economic and political actors. A similar initiative was launched
in July 1997 (Torino Incontra, 1997). The aim of these initiatives was precisely to iden-
tify a shared vision of the future of the area, but they appear to have had no political fal-
lout to date.
15 The most recent was that of Bettin - Magnier, 1995.
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communes of the metropolitan
area, two elections have already
been held under the new rules. It
is thus possible to ask to what ex-
tent this has affected the prospects
for a new metropolitan govern-
ment. Various Italian studies have
shown how, in the first 25 years in
the life of the Republic, the mayors
of large cities displayed all the
characteristics of local notables,
but were actually selected through
intermediation by the parties16. In
the sixties, a new type of mayor
emerged, more closely tied to the
phenomenon of the professionali-
sation of politics as a consequence
of the growing role of political
parties in Italian society. The 1993
reform, combined with the inten-
se process of delegitimatisation of
traditional political parties increa-
sed the clout of mayors and city
spokesmen arriving directly from
civil society, although empirical
evidence shows that the channels
of recruitment are still very often,
directly or indirectly, linked to the
political parties. What would ap-
pear to be becoming more conso-
lidated is a managerial-entrepre-
neurial vision of the mayor’s role,
an experience to be exploited sub-
sequently not so much in high-le-
vel political posts as in managerial
activities in civil society, especially
in the world of economics. Politics
is no longer defined as ‘the capa-
city to deal with men but to deal
with the rules and financial re-
sources offered by the communal
machine with a view to achieving
short-term concrete objectives’
(Bettin - Magnier, 1995, p. 116).
In reality, the failure to solve the
problems of a large urban area su-
ch as Turin confirms how the
1993 reform has mainly influen-
ced forms of communal govern-
ment, stabilising executives and
helping bipolar electoral models
to emerge, but also that this is a
necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition to perform a role of gover-
nance. In other words, it has in-
fluenced the capacity to solve col-
lective problems such as the pro-
motion of an adequate process of
development of a metropolitan
area17. As analysis of other study
cases shows, local institutions mu-
st be capable of governing a com-
plex network of interactions
among the principal public and
private players inside a metropoli-
tan area. Indeed, in Turin the par-
tial ‘de-professionalisation’ of po-
litics is, in all likelihood, in para-
doxical contrast with the need for
a ‘metropolitan political entrepre-
16 See Bettin - Magnier, 1995 and Spreafico, 1963. For differences between French and
Italian mayors, see the now classic study by Tarrow (1979); on the effects of the 1993
electoral legislation, see Vandelli, 1997. 
17 For an analysis of the problems connected with the decision-making processes of Ita-
lian communes, see Bobbio, 1997.
W o r k i n g  p a p e r  n .  1 2 4 ,  1 9 9 9
30
neur’ capable of building a new
supracommunal political space
and creating a specific coalition of
interests – a sort of Turinese ur-
ban growth machine – specifically
for the purpose. The lack of a
strategic metropolitan planning
scheme as a symbolic foundation
for the new political space is
further proof of the fact. The ab-
sence of a clear metropolitan poli-
tical leadership – a feature clearly
evident in the other case studies,
with the exception of the Geneva-
Lausanne metropolis – is proba-
bly the main cause of Turin’s insti-
tutional stagnation.
All of which is bound up with
the problems, outlined above, of
intergovernmental relations in
Italy, where existing institutions
are an objective obstacle to me-
tropolitan reform – and not only
in Turin, as the history of Bologna
shows. 
The picture we have outlined
here would be incomplete
without a brief reference to the
conduct of the mayors of the
communes in the metropolitan
area. In a recent Ires survey on
the 42 mayors of communes in
Turin’s two concentric suburban
rings18, the absence of a metropo-
litan political space – i.e., a con-
text of preferential co-operative
relations – clearly emerges. Rela-
tions between satellite communes
and the central commune itself
are regarded by mayors as diffi-
cult and conflictual and the image
of the commune of Turin which
emerges is one of a subject with
hegemonic intentions, keen to
dump the negative effects of its
own policies on bordering com-
munes. The meagre technical-po-
litical interactions which take pla-
ce are concentrated exclusively in
the communes of the first ring.
Vice versa, networks of relations
based on mutual confidence have
developed among the various
groups of communes of the me-
tropolitan area, which often cor-
respond to the administrative
spaces previously occupied by lo-
cal health units. Likewise, it is
worth noting that these co-opera-
tive formulas are often designed
to promote economic develop-
ment initiatives. If friction some-
times arises among communes, it
usually stems from differences in
size (i.e., small communes versus
large communes).
Answers to a specific request
for an assessment of the metropo-
litan model reveal the existence of
three categories of mayors: those
in favour of structural solutions,
supporters of a functional-type
solution and mild opponents,
those with strong doubts but, no-
netheless, open to a functional so-
lution, which thus gains majority
18 Cf. Ires, 1998.
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approval (figure 3). All, however,
betrayed a certain unwillingness
to side with one solution rather
than another out of fear of larger
entities such as the Commune of
Turin and the Provincial and Re-
gional Authorities. This diffiden-
ce also derives from the fact that
mayors have very vague knowled-
ge – if any at all – of metropolitan
government reform proposals or
of the experiments in progress (in
Bologna, Rome and Florence). 
Conclusions
The Turin area has long expe-
rience of the problems caused by
the two main types of institutio-
nal fragmentation: namely, func-
tional and political. The problem
of metropolitan governance has
invariably been addressed in
terms of the second. The special
authorities set up to solve secto-
rial/functional problems have, vi-
ce versa, low political visibility.
There is more talk about the in-
clusion of Poirino (a commune
on the outskirts of Turin) in the
metropolitan area than the exten-
sion of the aqueduct service the-
reto by the city of Turin’s munici-
pal water company. In this sense,
the technical bureaucracies of
special companies have played a
major role, fostering the emer-
gence of what we have defined as
an implicit functional model th-
rough a variable geometry geo-
Figure 3   Opinions of mayors in the metropolitan area about models
of metropolitan government
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graphical structure. This model
looks bound to be consolidated
vis-à-vis an emerging phenome-
non mentioned above – that of
the privatisation of some net-
worked services – which makes
the problem of co-ordinating lo-
cal public services among the va-
rious communes of the con-
urbation less important, irrespec-
tive of certain aspects of strategic
policies in the area (for example,
choices for water sourcing or the
location of refuse disposal sites).
The consequence of political
fragmentation has been poor co-
operation between the central
commune and the communes in
the area, which have always felt
‘exploited’ by Turin (in the field
of public building policies, for
example). This has hindered the
development of a ‘metropolitan
community’; as a result, today the
metropolitan problem is one of
governance and, as such, cannot
be easily solved using the original
proposals envisaged by Law No.
142/1990.
The sad fact is that Turin has
failed to respond equally well –
returning to Dente’s effective ter-
minology – to the problems of the
‘big village’, the ‘functional re-
gion’ and the ‘capital city’.
Our initial research leads us to
feel that the ‘big village’ challenge
has been partly addressed and
won. The management of large-
scale networked services in the
Turin metropolitan area would
appear to rely more on privatisa-
tion and market decentralisation
than on the building of new pu-
blic co-ordination structures at
the metropolitan level.
There can be no doubt, though,
that responses to the ‘functional
region’ and ‘capital city’ challen-
ges have fallen short of the mark.
The need for co-ordination of
land planning policies (the func-
tions communes are most jealous
of!) has yet to mature, with the
consequence that there is no sha-
red vision of the future of the area
– a necessary premise for any at-
tempt at strategic planning (it is
important to note that this state
of affairs exists despite the fact
that, politically, the local govern-
ment majority is relatively homo-
geneous). There are contradic-
tory signals that the need is now
beginning to be felt. For example,
an agency (Agenzia per gli inve-
stimenti a Torino e in Piemonte)
has been set up to promote inve-
stment in Turin and Piedmont,
through a partnership among the
Region, the Province, the munici-
pality of Turin, the Chamber of
Commerce and some industrial
associations; a convention has
been stipulated between the
Commune of Turin and 17 com-
munes in the surrounding area to
co-ordinate cultural policies, but
the new urban policy planning
and co-ordination mission recen-
tly established for the CIT (the
Turin Intercommunal Consor-
W o r k i n g  p a p e r  n .  1 2 4 ,  1 9 9 9
33
tium, an association of 17 com-
munes in the metropolitan area)
so far has been unsuccessful. It is,
nonetheless, significant that in
the election programmes of the
candidates of the two major poli-
tical groupings (Polo per le Li-
bertà [Pole for Liberties] and
L’Ulivo Alleanza per il Governo
[Olive Tree Government Allian-
ce]) in the recent mayoral elec-
tions in Turin, the metropolitan
issue was entirely marginal. The
programme of the outgoing
mayor Castellani (re-elected on
May 11, 1997) only speaks of the
hypothesis of building a ‘forum
for development’ to promote Tu-
rin’s development on new econo-
mic bases, open to entrepreneurs,
social forces, cultural institutions
and universities, without any
mention of the other communes
in the metropolitan area19.
A variety of different explana-
tions can be put forward for all
these hold-ups. First and foremo-
st, comes the conflict between re-
gional authority and local authori-
ties. For the regional authority,
the birth of a powerful metropoli-
tan local government would se-
riously jeopardise its role. If Italy
were to embark on the road
towards a strong regional model,
we would most likely be faced
with weak metropolitan govern-
ments (along the lines of Ger-
many and Spain). If, vice versa,
the regional experience were to
progressively decline, we might
find ourselves with a network of
large cities allied with their re-
spective provincial authorities,
which would negotiate directly
with the central government over
the most important urban poli-
cies. Likewise, there continues to
be reciprocal diffidence between
Turin and the communes of its va-
rious rings, which are afraid of
being dominated by the central
commune, seen as a sort of ‘big
brother’. The interviews with the
mayors show that the climate of
diffidence is caused not only by
objectively bad past experiences,
but also by a lack of mutual con-
tact and information; the fact is
that no federal model can be in-
troduced if there is no entity to
promote a network of trust
(although it is not clear what that
entity should be) similar to the
one that has underpinned the Bo-
logna experiment. After all, the
failure of the project to set up a
new province in Rotterdam20
shows just how hard it is to build
a model of consensus round the
government of a large urban area,
even when external conditions are
19 The proposal is contained in a paragraph in the programme entitled precisely ‘A capi-
tal city’.
20 Cf. Te Velde, 1996; Vergès, 1997; Van der Veer, 1998.
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exceedingly favourable, as well as
the importance of effective public
communication when under-
taking courageous institutional in-
novation; last but not least, the
lack of visible political leadership.
In conclusion, to use the ever
effective metaphor of Ostrom,
Tiebout and Warren21, no one in
Turin is waiting for Gargantua to
solve all its metropolitan pro-
blems, but the emergence of a
metropolitan governance model
is still a long way behind schedu-
le. Nonetheless, over the last two
or three years there has been a
clear tendency – at least in the
cultural debate – to question the
structural model envisaged by
Law No. 142/1990 and replace it
with contractual/federative-type
hypotheses22 consistent with the
proposals of national laws, iden-
tifying what we have called the
‘capital city challenge’ as the crux
of the metropolitan problem. A
new proposal is under the scru-
tiny of parliament and, if appro-
ved, could open a new way for
the building of a functional flexi-
ble model.
It is hard to say, however, if and
when the issue will be addressed.
Only when the future develop-
ment of regionalism in Italy beco-
mes clearer shall we able to un-
derstand the direction that policy
will move in.
21 Cf. Ostrom - Tiebout - Warren, 1961.
22 For a reconstruction of the problem of the government of metropolitan areas in Italy,
see Ferlaino - Piperno, 1996.
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